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Abstract How much information should brokers supply on a website? The
Internet allows brokers to reduce the cost of providing
information to potential buyers. However, brokers may risk
disintermediation if they provide too much information. This
paper presents a model of a broker’s choice of how much
information to provide on a website. The model considers
buyers’ tradeoffs between hiring a broker and gathering
information on their own. It then investigates why real estate
brokers in different countries provide different amounts of
information on websites. Tests reveal that information provided
on broker websites depends on the search cost of prospective
buyers.
Introduction
Real estate brokers can utilize the Internet to reduce the cost of providing
information to potential buyers. The upside for the broker is that buyers can match
with sellers and self-select properties they are interested in and reduce the time
and cost a broker must spend identifying and showing properties to the buyer.
Moore (2000) states: ‘‘A better-informed consumer leads to a more productive
agent, which can save time and money for the real estate company.’’ The broker
essentially transfers the cost of the time to select properties to the potential buyer.
However, a downside may exist if the potential buyer sees an opportunity to cut
out the broker and attempts to locate and purchase the property, thus saving the
broker’s commission charges. A broker may risk disintermediation if too much
information is provided. For example, almost no real estate websites provide
property addresses. The likely reason is that buyers could seek out the seller on
their own and cut out the broker.
What are the risks of the Internet for real estate brokers? What factors are
important in weighing these risks? These are questions that are of great interest
to the brokerage industry. Exploring theoretical and empirical models of the
potential of the Internet to reduce both broker income and the demand for
brokerage services are important tasks for researchers. This paper takes an
important step in this research with a formal analysis of the factors that may2  Gwin
inﬂuence a real estate broker’s decision on how much information to provide on
a website. The contribution of this study is in developing and testing a theoretical
model that demonstrates the tradeoffs a broker faces in developing a website. The
model identiﬁes and subsequent testing veriﬁes that a key factor in determining
how much information a broker should provide on a website is the search cost of
prospective buyers.
 Literature Review
The previous literature on real estate brokerage and the Internet has examined (1)
the direct beneﬁts and costs to brokers of the new technology of the Internet and
(2) the potential indirect cost of broker disintermediation. Much of the literature
seeks to advise real estate brokers on how they can most effectively utilize the
Internet. Most of these papers address the impact of wide availability of
information via the Internet on the conduct of real estate brokerage. However,
there has been little more than a discussion of the potential of the Internet for
broker disintermediation. Only recently have researchers started to formally
characterize factors that may contribute to broker disintermediation.
The concern about disintermediation is reﬂected quite well in a mock discussion
in Guttery, Baen, and Benjamin (2000): ‘‘The fear mongers’ theory is simple: If
buyers and sellers can sit at their computers and gather enough information about
each other’s offerings—and even make offers—why should they pay real estate
brokers?’’ Tse and Webb (2002) echo this concern: ‘‘With the advance of
technology, it is possible that the Internet would enable information sharing and
the bypassing of traditional information structures.’’ Tse and Webb point to the
need for more research on understanding the costs of an Internet presence for a
broker. An important cost to consider in evaluating the potential of the Internet
for disintermediation of brokerage services is a buyer’s search cost. The important
issue is whether the Internet reduces buyer search cost to a level that is lower
than the brokerage fee. If so, the buyer will conduct the search and will have no
need for a broker.
Baen and Guttery (1997) assert that, prior to the development of recent
technologies, the cost of acquiring information previously led buyers to use
brokers in real estate transactions. They and Tucillo (1997) argue that the reduction
in information costs afforded by new technologies such as computers and easily
available databases will lead to lower costs per transaction and a need for fewer
brokers. Unlike Benjamin and Chinloy (1995) who contend that technology
increases sale price, Baen and Guttery argue that lower transaction costs will result
in an income transfer from brokers to sellers and buyers.
Guttery, Baen and Benjamin (2000) pose their concerns about broker
disintermediation as: ‘‘If information is power and if more information about real
estate markets is available to the general public through technology, theseInternational Comparisons of Real Estate  3
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technological changes signal a transfer of power to consumers that will devalue
information and services previously available only through REALTORS, their
associates and other real estate sales licensees. The industry may be close to
imploding as it faces the challenges of new vehicles such as the Internet for
disseminating real estate information.’’
Miles (2000) offers the ‘‘two real estate dot-coms’’ theory that builds on the ideas
of Baen and Guttery (1997). The ﬁrst real estate dot-com world will evolve with
the question of how many brokers will remain as the Internet reduces the need
for brokers. Miles addresses disintermediation in the commercial brokerage
industry as: ‘‘The net loves to cut out middlemen and reduce margins.’’The second
real estate dot-com world will evolve as online real estate brokers choose the
geography in which to most proﬁtably extend their services. Well-ﬁnanced
brokerages will become increasingly concentrated and powerful. Miles asserts that
above average growth will take place in preferred neighborhoods. On the other
hand, disparities in income and education mean that less attractive geographies
will be losers.
Stanﬁll (1999/2000) addresses the risk of disintermediation for commercial real
estate brokers as the best way to beat the Internet is to join the Internet. Real
estate brokers must simply accept the Internet as a way of doing business and
ﬁnd a way to maintain their value-add in the supply chain. In a survey of 150
brokers in Ohio, Muhanna (2000) seems to support Stanﬁll’s contention by ﬁnding
that the driver behind a broker adopting the Internet is the wish to attract new
buyers and cut buyer acquisition costs as opposed to a simple fear of losing
business. On the other hand, Muhanna cautions that brokers may be
underestimating the threat posed by the Internet for broker disintermediation.
Similar conclusions are reached in Aalberts and Townsend (1999), Crowston and
Wigand (1999), Crowston, Sawyer and Wigand (2001), Jud and Roulac (2001)
and Ford and Rutherford (2002).
Bond, Seiler, Seiler and Blake (2000) recognize that the Internet provides the least-
cost method of providing real estate information. They argue that all realtors can
remain competitive only if they offer their properties on the Internet. Bond et al.
survey the Ohio real estate brokerage market for web usage. The survey ﬁnds that
most brokers have their own websites or list properties on other sites and that
soon all brokers will. The survey also indicates that the amount of information
provided on real estate sites is increasing. Seiler, Seiler and Bond (2000) also
determine that brokers have done a good job adopting information technology.
Bardhan, Jaffee and Kroll (2000) reach an analogous conclusion and ﬁnd that real
estate brokers can reinvent themselves as a new kind of intermediary who can
thrive in the Internet world.
This idea that embracing information technology can have positive net beneﬁts
for real estate brokers is empirically conﬁrmed in Jud, Winkler and Sirmans
(2002), Sirmans and Swicegood (2000) and Benjamin, Jud, Roth and Winkler4  Gwin
(2002a). Using data from the 2001 National Association of REALTORS Proﬁle
of Residential Real Estate Brokerages, Benjamin, Jud, Roth and Winkler (2002a)
focuses on the Internet and ﬁnds that the net income of residential real estate
brokers increases with use of the Internet. Zumpano, Johnson and Anderson
(2002) utilizes the 2000 National Association of REALTORS Proﬁle of Home
Buyers and Sellers to examine the hypotheses that the Internet will affect broker
income and/or the demand for brokerage services by empirically studying how
the Internet impacts buyer search time and the intensity of buyer search. They
ﬁnd that the Internet reduces search time however search intensity actually
increases. Buyers end up looking at more properties without extending search
duration. Zumpano, Johnson and Anderson argue that as buyers become more
efﬁcient in identifying properties they are interested in, brokers can then focus
their time on pursuing the most likely sales opportunities. The same argument is
made by Ong, Miller and Chow (2002). Zumpano, Johnson and Anderson interpret
their ﬁndings as support for the previous literature that advises brokers to expand
their web presence in order to insure their survival as an intermediary in real
estate transactions.
There are two important caveats to note in regards to the empirical ﬁndings that
real estate brokers can beneﬁt from using the Internet. The ﬁrst caveat is that the
aforementioned research is based on a relatively short-term effect of the Internet.
Ford and Rutherford (2002) report the results of a 2000 survey of agents who
listed properties on the North Texas Regional Multiple Listing Service. Findings
include that 28% of the survey participants believe the Internet will negatively
impact commissions in the short run while 53% believe there will be a negative
impact in the long run. While ﬁndings of the short-term beneﬁts of the Internet
are encouraging, it is prudent to gauge the long-term potential of the Internet to
reduce either broker income or the demand for broker services. The second caveat
is that the aforementioned research has focused on real estate brokerage in the
United States. Delcoure and Miller (2001) study how worldwide brokerage fees
vary with information availability. They ﬁnd that brokerage fees are lower in
countries where trustworthy information is efﬁciently and openly provided. They
use these ﬁndings to predict that real estate commission fees in the U.S. should
fall to 5% in the next decade and to 2% or 3% within two decades. They also
predict a reduction in the number of brokers, with the surviving brokers earning
the same or more income than before.
The concern about broker disintermediation in the previous literature and the
uncertainty about the long-term effects of the Internet on broker income points to
a signiﬁcant gap in the literature. An important question that needs to be addressed
is: What factors should a real estate broker consider in determining the amount
of information to provide on a website? Zumpano, Johnson and Anderson (2002)
take an important ﬁrst step by pointing to the need to consider buyer search cost.
This paper takes the next step in analyzing how buyer search cost affect the
amount of information provided on real estate websites around the world.International Comparisons of Real Estate  5
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 A Model of Real Estate E-nformation on the Internet
This section develops a theoretical model of real estate information provision on
the Internet. The model leads to a testable hypothesis on the relationship between
the amount of information provided on real estate websites and the likelihood that
a buyer will disintermediate the broker and purchase the property because the
Internet reduces the search cost.
Assumptions
The players include a real estate broker and a buyer who is seeking to purchase
a home. The price of the home is given by P. The buyer has reservation price R
for the home.
A seller is excluded to allow a focus on information that the broker may provide
to the buyer. An implicit assumption of the model is that brokers do not restrict
access to information provided on the Internet, an assumption consistent with
reality at this time. If brokers could restrict information on the Internet to buyers
who have signed exclusive representation agreements, then brokers would clearly
supply all available information on the website. Locations that permit such
exclusive representation agreements would be consistent with brokers providing
more information on the Internet. However, no evidence was found of such
restrictions on any real estate website.
The broker is paid a ﬁxed-percentage commission rate represented by s. The
broker incurs a ﬁxed hourly cost of c to provide information to a buyer. The
number of hours (h) a broker spends to inform a buyer depends on the amount
of information (I) personally communicated to the buyer where h increases at an
increasing rate with I, i.e., h(I)  0 and h(I)  0.
The broker can choose how much information to disclose about the home on a
website. Information provided on a website (IW) reduces the information (I) that
the broker must personally provide the buyer about the real estate.
The broker’s payoff () if a home is sold is the commission less the cost of
providing information to a buyer:
  sP  ch(I). (1)
The buyer’s ﬁxed hourly search cost to acquire information about potential
properties is given by . The buyer can either spend time (tB) in hours gathering
information independently (IB) or spend time (tW) gathering information (IW) from
the broker’s website, thus the total time spent gathering information (t)i sg i v e n6  Gwin
by t  tB(IB)  tW(IW). The time a buyer spends acquiring information increases
with the amount of information gathered, i.e.,  0 and  0. Let IT t(I ) t (I ) BB WW
be the total information gathered by the buyer where IT  IB  IW. The buyer
must gather some ﬁxed amount of total information in order to identify a (I ) T
home for potential purchase. Consistent with the previous literature, it is assumed
here that information gathered by the buyer from the broker’s website requires
much less time than gathering the information independently. This means that
decreases with IW, i.e.,  0. The additional time spent by a buyer
t(I ) T t(I ) T IW
gathering information independently is likely to have diminishing returns, i.e.,
 0. However, there should not be such diminishing returns associated with t(I) B
a buyer gathering information from a website. Thus, decreases at an t(I ) T
increasing rate with IW, i.e.,  0.
2  t(I ) T
2 IW
The buyer’s payoff (U) if a broker is used to buy a house is the reservation price
less the purchase price of the real estate and the broker’s commission:
U  R  (1  s)P. (2)
The buyer’s payoff from independently searching for and buying a house is the
reservation price less the purchase price of the real estate and the total cost of
searching for information:
U  R  P  t(I ). (3) T
The Model
Equations (2) and (3) lead to the conclusion that the buyer will choose to use a
broker if transaction costs (the broker’s fees) are less than the buyer’s total cost
to search for a home independently. This is represented as:
sP  t(I ). (4) T
The broker’s problem is to maximize the payoff by choosing the amount of
information that is made available on the Internet:International Comparisons of Real Estate  7
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max   sP  ch(I) (5)
IW
subject to the buyer’s participation constraint given by Equation (4).
Analysis of the Model
The broker’s objective function of Equation (5) shows that proﬁt increases as more
information is provided on a website. With no constraints, the broker would
provide all available information about listings on the website. However, Equation
(4) introduces the possibility of broker disintermediation if the broker provides
too much information on a website. Given the constraint, the broker will provide
just enough information that the buyer will not choose to search for a property
independently. Thus, the broker’s optimal choice of the amount of information to
provide on the website is IW where the constraint of Equation (4) is satisﬁed (I*) W
as an equality. This is represented as:
I*  I t(I )  sP  0. (6) WW T
The broker’s optimal choice is represented in Exhibit 1. I* W
The question to consider now is does the information provided on the website
vary with the buyer’s search cost. Totally differentiating Equation (6) with respect
to  results in:
dt dIW t    0. (7)
dI d W
Solving Equation (7) for the change in website information with a change in buyer
search cost yields:
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Formulation of the Hypothesis
The result of Equation (8) is represented in Exhibit 2. An increase in buyer search
cost from L to H increases the amount of information provided on the broker’s
website from IWL to IWH.
Equation (8) and Exhibit 2 imply the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Real estate brokers will provide relatively more information on
their websites if their prospective buyers have relatively higher
search costs.
Real estate brokers will provide more information in geographies characterized
by buyers who have high search cost. This intuitively appealing idea is consistent
with the claims of Miles (2000) that most growth of online brokerage will take
place in preferred neighborhoods.International Comparisons of Real Estate  9
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 Testing the Hypothesis
This section will test the hypothesis that follows from Equation (8). The tests will
investigate why real estate brokers in different countries provide different types
of information on e-commerce websites. The prediction is that more information
will be provided on websites in countries where buyers have a high cost of search.
Alternative Explanations
The hypothesis of the previous section was based on individual differences
between buyers. It may also be important to consider individual differences
between ﬁrms. While signiﬁcant demographic data is available that characterizes
the average resident of a country, little international data can be found that10  Gwin
Exhibit 3  Summary of Predictions from the Literature
Hypothesis Supporting Literature
The Internet may lead to
disintermediation of real estate
brokers.
Baen and Guttery (1997), Tucillo (1997), Aalberts and
Townsend (1999), Crowston and Wigand (1999),
Stanﬁll (1999/2000), Bond, Seiler, Seiler and Blake
(2000), Guttery, Baen and Benjamin (2000), Miles
(2000), Muhanna (2000), Delcoure and Miller
(2001), Crowston, Sawyer and Wigand (2001), Jud
and Roulac (2001), Ford and Rutherford (2002) and
Tse and Webb (2002)
Buyer search cost is an important
factor in how the Internet will affect
broker income and the demand for
brokerage services.
Zumpano, Johnson and Anderson (2002)
Economies of scale exist in providing
information on a real estate website.
Muhanna (2000) and Seiler, Seiler and Bond (2001)
Real estate websites are particularly
useful for vacation rentals.
Bardhan, Jaffee and Kroll (2000)
characterizes each country’s average real estate ﬁrm. Thus, the opportunity to
explore alternative explanations is limited by the availability of data.
One possible alternative explanation as to why real estate website information
differs across countries is that the willingness of brokers to adopt new technology
differs across countries. Muhanna (2000) tests the hypothesis that the likelihood
a real estate broker will adopt the Internet depends on ﬁrm characteristics such as
age, number of agents and sales. Muhanna ﬁnds that the likelihood increases with
increases in the number of agents and sales. Firm age does not appear to matter.
Seiler, Seiler and Bond (2001) ﬁnd that the use of computers and software
increases with brokerage ﬁrm size. Muhanna and Seiler, Seiler and Bond both
ﬁnd scale effects in Internet adoption. There may be similar economies of scale
effects associated with country size. Proxies for country size such as gross
domestic product (GDP) and population are readily available.
A second possible explanation is that real estate ﬁrm structure differs across
countries. Bardhan, Jaffee and Kroll (2000) point out that Internet features such
as a search tool, graphics, virtual tours and geographic reach are particularly
important to real estate ﬁrms such as listing brokers and vacation rentals. While
listing brokers can be found in almost every country in the world, vacation rentals
are more likely to be found in countries that have resort areas. Countries with
resort areas may have more real estate websites that provide more information
simply because of the presence of vacation rentals. The Internet seems to be an
ideal way to provide information on vacation rentals.International Comparisons of Real Estate  11
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The Empirical Model
Exhibit 3 summarizes the predictions of the literature and this paper that form the
basis for the development of an empirical model that can be used to examine the
provision of information on real estate broker websites.
The empirical model that follows from (1) the theorized relationship between the
amount of information a broker provides on a website (IW) and buyer search cost
(), (2) a control for possible economies of scale effects (N) and (3) a control for
vacation rentals (V) that is given by:
I  ƒ(,N,V), (9) W
where ƒ describes some general functional relationship between the variables.
 The Data
The Dependent Variable
The International Real Estate Directory (IRED) at http://www.ired.com lists and
provides links to real estate websites around the world. An additional service
provided by the IRED is that they score each website on a scale of 1 to 4 for
information provision. The IRED has a special ‘‘Spotlight’’ score for the best
websites that will be coded as a 5 for this study. The IRED rating criteria are
shown in Exhibit 4. The data and rating criteria were obtained from the IRED
website in September 2002.
For the purposes of this paper, only real estate websites classiﬁed by the IRED
as ‘‘companies that do business in a single country’’ have been included in the
study to allow matching of an IRED rating with a country-level measure of buyer
search cost. A list of the countries available for this study and a summary of
website ratings are shown in the Appendix.
There are several possible ways to represent the dependent variable of Equation
(9). Candidates include the highest website score in each country, the number of
websites in each country, the sum of the website scores for each country and the
average or median website score for each country. While each of these alternatives
will be examined in the testing that follows, using the highest website score seems
the most intuitive. At any given time, only a small fraction of the population of
any country would be in the market for real estate. Presumably, this relatively
small pool of buyers could access any of the available websites in that country.
It stands to reason that buyers would start their search with the websites that
provide the most information and then supplement their search with information12  Gwin






The Prime Location Spotlight puts the spotlight on those sites
that are so compelling that even jaded website reviewers
bookmark them for frequent reference. They generally meet all
the highest design criteria, ease of use, aesthetics, quality of
information and usefulness, but most of all they have
compelling content. Prime Location is not just a rating, it is a
commendation; a recognition that a site offers an advancement
of the medium.
4 Excellent Attractive and informative website. Uses the web as a medium
well, as opposed to treating a website like a print ad. Strong,
useful information for someone seeking real estate help.
3 Very
good
Good presentation and/or information, with or without
listings. Generally covers more than one subject or type of
information.
2 Average Average site. Is worth a look if you need an agent or are
seeking property in that particular area.
1 Not ready This includes sites that might be useful but which suffer from
too many broken links, have no information at all, or are
simply too new to be useful at the time of review. Needs
plenty of work before it is of value to users.
Source: International Real Estate Directory website at http://www.ired.com.
on other websites as needed. The U.S. is a good example of this reasoning. Many
buyers start at major websites that provide extensive amounts of information such
as realtor.com or the large national brokerage ﬁrms. After focusing their search
in an area of interest, buyers may then access the websites of local franchise or
independent brokerage ﬁrms that typically provide much less information.
Using either the number of websites or the sum of the website scores as the
dependent variable limits interpretation of the results because these variables only
measure the overall quantity of information in a country and not the degree of
informativeness (or quality) of an individual website. Using the average website
score resolves the quantity/informativeness (quality) problem, however a new
problem arises given the nature of the data. In the data, countries that have
websites with high scores generally also have many websites with low scores.
Thus, averaging most affects the countries with the highest rated websites.
Averaging diminishes variance to a degree that it may be difﬁcult to ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between average website score and any
dependent variable.International Comparisons of Real Estate  13
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The Independent Variables
Buyer search cost should ideally include both direct search expenses and the
opportunity costs of search. Unfortunately, a measure of direct search expenses
on a cross-country basis is not available. Thus, it is necessary to assume that
variation in buyer search cost can be captured by the variation in the opportunity
costs of search. In a cross-country setting, a buyer’s opportunity costs of search
can be proxied by a country’s standard of living. One measure of standard of
living is GDP per capita. In their U.S.-based study, Zumpano, Johnson and
Anderson (2002) also choose to employ a measure of income as a proxy for a
buyer’s opportunity cost of search. Other economic proxies for the opportunity
costs of search are age, education and homeownership rates. Each will be
considered in turn in the testing that follows.
The control variable for possible economies of scale (N) associated with country
size can be proxied either by GDP or population. The control variable for vacation
rentals (V) is a dummy set to 1 if the country has any resort properties.
Gross domestic product per capita, age structure and population data were
obtained from The World Factbook 2002 published by the Central Intelligence
Agency at http://www.cia.gov. Age structure is the percentage of the population
in age ranges 1–14, 15–64, and 65 and over. Age structure 15–64 will be used
as the proxy for the opportunity cost of search because that structure is associated
with people that are of working age. Education is measured by school life
expectancy as reported in the ‘‘School Life Expectancy & Transition rate from
primary to secondary (general programmes only), for school years 1998/1999 and
1999/2000’’ statistical table released November 1, 2002 from the UNESCO
Institute for Statistics at http://www.uis.unesco.org. Homeownership rates are
measured by ‘‘Owner %’’ of ‘‘Households in Occupied Housing Units’’ in the
‘‘Statistical Annexes to the Global Report on Human Settlements 2001, Table B-
3 Ownership of Housing Units’’ from the United Nations Human Settlements
Programme at http://www.unhabitat.org. The IRED identiﬁes countries that have
real estates websites that serve ‘‘resort or vacation properties.’’
Empirical Methodology
The dependent variable is referred to as a ‘‘rating’’ by the IRED. However, one
could argue that the IRED is really providing a ‘‘ranking’’ of the websites.
Distinguishing whether the IRED score is a rating or a ranking is important for
the choice of an appropriate statistical technique for the analysis. This paper will
examine both alternatives.
Treating the IRED score as a ranking requires the use of statistical technique that
estimates the relationship between an ordinal dependent variable and the set of
independent variables. Maximum-likelihood ordered probit is an appropriate
model if the error term is normally distributed. Expressing Equation (9) as an
ordered probit model yields:14  Gwin
Pr(I  j)  Pr(     N   V  ), (10) W,ij 1 xi N i Vi i j
where Pr(IW,i  j) is the probability of observing a website score j, j is cut point
j and i is a normally distributed error term. Estimations are made using a robust
estimator of variance that allows for heteroscedasticity.
More conventional statistical techniques can be utilized if the IRED score is
treated as a rating. Assuming Equation (9) can be represented as a linear
relationship, the empirical model is speciﬁed as:
I  	    N   V  , (11) W,i  iN iV ii
where i is a normally distributed error term. Equation (11) will be analyzed with
a simple ordinary least squares model that ﬁrst eliminates gross outliers and then
uses a robust estimator of variance that allows for heteroscedasticity.
 Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the four candidates for the dependent variable, the four
proxies for buyer search cost, the two proxies for country scale and the resort area
dummy variable are shown in Exhibit 5.
A point worth noting is that average score has a maximum value that is 1.67 less
than the maximum value of highest score while the difference between the means
is 1.13. It does appear that averaging most affects the countries with the highest
rated websites. Averaging signiﬁcantly reduces standard deviation, which may
make it difﬁcult to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between average
website score and the dependent variables.
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Probit Estimation Results
and Analysis
Exhibit 6 reports the estimated coefﬁcients of Equation (10) using the highest
website score as the dependent variable and ﬁve combinations of the proxies for
buyer search cost and country scale along with the resort dummy variable as the
independent variables. Tests do not indicate a violation of the assumption that the
error term is normally distributed. Note that the other three candidates for the
dependent variable (the number of websites, the sum of the website scores andInternational Comparisons of Real Estate  15
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Exhibit 5  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Highest score 120 3.45 1.26 0 5
Number of websites 120 30.82 95.35 0 940
Total score 120 79.52 241.70 0 2,324
Average score 120 2.32 0.78 0 3.33
GDP per capita (thousands) 120 11.40 8.95 0.71 36.4
Age, 15–64 120 64.78 4.89 52.3 75.3
Education (years) 76 12.51 2.59 5 16.9
Ownership rate 44 66.00 15.94 3.9 90.6
GDP ($U.S. billions) 120 266.92 614.36 0.10 4,583.2
Population (in millions) 120 42.53 151.11 0.01 1,273.1
Resort area dummy 120 0.58 0.50 0 1
the average website score) are not ordinal rankings and thus cannot be used in an
ordered probit model. The ﬁrst set of independent variables is GDP per capita as
a proxy for buyer search cost, GDP as a proxy for country scale and a resort area
dummy variable. Findings are reported in results column 1 of Exhibit 6. Results
columns 2 through 5 report ﬁndings for other combinations of the independent
variables as indicated in Exhibit 6.
The results of Exhibit 6 provide signiﬁcant support for the hypothesis that real
estate brokers provide more information on their websites if prospective buyers
have high search costs. As indicated in results columns 1, 3, 4 and 5, the data are
robust to the choice of proxy for buyer search cost. One way to interpret the
coefﬁcients on the proxies for buyer search cost in Exhibit 6 is to examine how
much the highest website score differs with the difference between the value of
the proxy one standard deviation below the mean (the low search cost countries)
and the value one standard deviation above the mean (the high search cost
countries). For GDP per capita, this difference is 17.9 thousand. Given the
coefﬁcient on GDP per capita of 0.028 from Exhibit 6, the difference in the highest
website score between a low search cost country and a high search cost country
is 0.5. Thus, high search cost countries have, on average, a 0.5 better highest score
website than do their low search cost counterparts. The mean highest website score
for the low search cost countries is actually 3.2 whereas the high search cost
countries is 3.8. The best real estate websites in low search cost countries are
generally rated closer to ‘‘very good’’ whereas the best websites in high search
cost countries are more likely to be rated ‘‘excellent.’’ An equivalent interpretation
of the other measures of buyer search cost (age 15–64, education and home
ownership rates) yields much the same results.16  Gwin









Age, 15–64 — — 0.058
(0.005)
——















Population (millions) — 0.0008
(0.100)
———
Vi, Resort 1.695 1.716 1.785 1.705 1.671
Dummy (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.199 0.196 0.210 0.202 0.172
Note: Estimation Equation: Pr(IW,i  j)  Pr(j1  i  NNi  VVi  i  j).
Ordinal Dependent Variable: Highest website score. The hypothesis is: Real estate brokers will
provide relatively more information on their websites if their prospective buyers have relatively
higher search costs. p-values are in parentheses under the point estimates.
The coefﬁcients on both GDP and population are positive and signiﬁcant in all
cases. There is evidence of economies of scale in providing information on real
estate websites at the country level. As results on scale effects are similar for all
four proxies of buyer search cost and using GDP yields the highest R2, results are
reported for GDP only in results columns 3–5. The positive and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient on the dummy variable Vi conﬁrms the idea that real estate brokers in
countries with resort areas generally provide more information on their websites.
The average highest website score for non-resort countries is 2.5 whereas the
average for resort countries is 4.1. Real estate websites in countries with resort
areas are, on average, rated ‘‘excellent’’ or better and their counterparts in
countries that do not have resort areas are somewhere between ‘‘average’’ and
‘‘very good.’’
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results and Analysis
Exhibit 7 reports the regression coefﬁcients of Equation (11) alternatively using
the highest website score, the average website score for each country, the sum ofInternational Comparisons of Real Estate  17
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Exhibit 7  OLS Regression Results for Testing the Hypothesis
Independent Variable
Form of Dependent Variable
Highest Score Average Score Sum of Scores Number of Websites
	, Constant 2.54 2.36 1.85 0.42
(0.018) (0.000) (0.604) (0.756)
i, Buyer Search Cost 0.023 0.001 0.873 0.346
(GDP per capita) (0.000) (0.762) (0.000) (0.000)
Ni, Scale (GDP) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0236 0.010
(0.171) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000)
Vi, Resort Dummy 1.120 0.273 28.540 10.488
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
F 22.97 4.47 55.25 60.92
Note: The hypothesis is: Real estate brokers will provide relatively more information on their
websites if their prospective buyers have relatively higher search costs. p-values are in parentheses
under the point estimates.
the website scores for each country, and the number of websites in each country
as the dependent variable. For ease of exposition, only the results with GDP per
capita, GDP, and the resort dummy as the independent variables are reported.
Using the other proxies for buyer search cost and scale yields similar results.
The results for highest score in Exhibit 7 are very similar to those of Exhibit 6.
Buyer search cost, scale and resort status are all signiﬁcant determinants of how
much information is provided on real estate websites. The ﬁnding that real estate
brokers provide more information on their websites if prospective buyers have
high search cost appears robust to the speciﬁcation of the empirical model. Using
sum of scores or number of websites as the dependent variable leads to the same
results as using highest score.
The only disappointing result is for using average score as the dependent variable.
The coefﬁcient on buyer search cost is still positive but not signiﬁcant. The
reduction in variance caused by averaging likely accounts for the lack of statistical
signiﬁcance. The sign on scale is actually negative in this case. As averaging most
affects the countries with the best real estate websites and the results for the
highest score indicate that the best real estate websites are likely associated with
larger countries, it can be inferred that averaging probably most affects the largest
countries. If this is the case, it is not surprising that the coefﬁcient on scale is not
what was expected.
The results and their implications for the hypotheses laid out in Exhibit 3 are
shown in Exhibit 8.18  Gwin
Exhibit 8  Hypotheses vs. Results
Hypothesis Results
Buyer search cost is an important factor in
how the Internet will affect broker income
and the demand for brokerage services.
Real estate brokers do provide more information
on their websites if their prospective buyers have
high search costs.
Economies of scale exist in providing
information on a real estate website.
More information is provided on real estate
websites in larger countries.
Real estate websites are particularly useful
for vacation rentals.
More information is provided on real estate
websites in countries with resort areas.
The Internet may lead to disintermediation
of real estate brokers.
Real estate brokers do seem to take
disintermediation into account when choosing how
much information to provide on their websites.
 Conclusion
This paper develops and tests a theoretical model that demonstrates the tradeoffs
a broker faces in developing a website. A broker reduces the costs of providing
information to the buyer by utilizing a website but may risk disintermediation if
too much information is provided.
The theoretical model identiﬁes a key factor determining how much information
a real estate broker should provide on the Internet as the search costs of
prospective buyers. As buyer search cost increases, a real estate broker can provide
more information on the Internet while still avoiding disintermediation. This
ﬁnding makes it clear that researchers and practitioners in real estate may need
to go beyond assessing the direct beneﬁts and costs of technological innovations
such as the Internet. It may be equally important to consider indirect costs.
The empirical section of the paper investigates why real estate brokers in different
countries provide different amounts of information on e-commerce websites.
Testing reveals that the amount of information provided on a real estate broker’s
website does indeed depend on buyers’ search cost. An additional ﬁnding
consistent with the previous literature is that more information is provided on in
real estate websites in larger countries and in countries with resort areas.
The empirical results imply that real estate brokers do take disintermediation into
account when choosing how much information to provide on their websites. As
much of the literature cautions, brokers must consider the potential of the Internet
to reduce both their incomes and the demand for their services. The good news
is that brokers appear to be heeding these cautions. Brokers around the world may
already be considering Guttery, Baen and Benjamin’s (2000) question about whyInternational Comparisons of Real Estate  19
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buyers and sellers should employ real estate brokers and Muhanna’s (2000)
warning that brokers may be underestimating the threat posed by the Internet for
broker disintermediation. Full adoption of the Internet may be inevitable for
brokers as many researchers suggest, but the pace of that adoption may very likely




Websites per IRED Rating





Albania 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Anguilla 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 8.2
Antigua/Barbuda 2 0 2 3 0 1 1 8.2
Antilles (Netherlands) 0 0 1 3 2 0 1 11.4
Armenia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
Aruba (Netherlands) 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 28
Argentina 5 2 8 6 1 0 1 12.9
Australia 6 18 122 169 63 10 1 23.2
Austria 2 0 6 6 2 0 1 25
Bahamas 0 2 4 15 8 0 1 15
Bahrain 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 15.9
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.57
Barbados 1 1 0 0 6 0 1 14.5
Belgium 0 2 13 11 7 1 1 25.3
Belize 3 0 6 10 5 1 1 3.2
Bermuda 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 33
Bolivia 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2.6
Brazil 0 2 13 10 2 0 1 6.5
British Virgin Islands 0 0 2 4 2 0 1 16
Bulgaria 0 3 6 1 1 0 1 6.2
Canada 7 27 485 362 54 5 1 24.8
Cayman Islands (UK) 1 6 14 10 8 0 1 24.5
China 5 0 3 0 1 0 0 3.6
Chile 0 1 5 1 0 0 0 10.1
Columbia 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 6.2
Costa Rica 1 3 24 38 15 3 1 6.7
Croatia 0 0 5 7 2 1 1 5.8
Cuba 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1.7
Cyprus 2 2 8 6 2 0 1 16
Czech Republic 0 4 10 9 2 0 1 12.9
Denmark 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 25.5
Dominica 2 0 1 3 0 0 1 4
Dominican Republic 4 2 11 7 4 0 1 5.720  Gwin
 Appendix (continued)
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Ecuador 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 2.9
Egypt 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 3.6
El Salvador 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 4
Estonia 0 1 1 3 0 0 1 10
Fiji 1 0 4 4 1 0 1 7.3
Finland 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 22.9
France 0 6 64 85 16 4 1 24.4
Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1
Germany 0 6 20 19 4 0 1 23.4
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.9
Gibraltar 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 17.5
Greece 0 5 29 18 7 1 1 17.2
Greenland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 20
Guatemala 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 3.7
Haiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.8
Honduras 1 0 4 5 4 0 1 2.7
Hong Kong 0 1 4 15 7 2 1 25.4
Hungary 1 5 13 6 2 1 1 11.2
Iceland 8 0 1 0 1 0 0 24.8
India 0 3 37 35 5 0 1 2.2
Indonesia 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 2.9
Israel 3 2 9 9 3 1 1 18.9
Ireland 0 3 36 30 10 0 1 21.6
Italy 1 9 38 33 14 0 1 22.1
Jamaica 0 1 3 7 1 1 1 3.7
Japan 1 2 14 14 6 0 1 24.9
Jordan 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 3.5
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5
Kenya 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 1.5
Korea 0 3 4 6 0 0 0 16.1
Kuwait 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 15
Latvia 0 0 7 1 1 0 0 7.2
Lebanon 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 5
Liechtenstein 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 23
Lithuania 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 7.3
Luxembourg 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 36.4
Macedonia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.4
Malawi 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.9
Malaysia 0 1 12 12 3 0 0 10.3
Malta 0 0 3 5 6 1 1 14.3
Mexico 1 8 66 66 14 2 1 9.1
Moldova 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 2.5International Comparisons of Real Estate  21
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Monaco 0 0 16 2 1 1 1 27
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.3
Morocco 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3.5
Namibia 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 4.3
Netherlands 0 4 20 8 7 0 1 24.4
New Zealand 0 6 14 25 19 0 1 17.7
Nicaragua 1 0 0 6 0 0 1 2.7
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.95
Northern Ireland 0 0 6 3 3 0 0 21.6
Norway 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 27.7
Pakistan 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 2
Panama 0 2 1 0 2 0 1 6
Paraguay 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4.8
Peru 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4.6
Philippines 0 5 15 7 0 0 1 3.8
Poland 0 3 5 5 3 0 0 8.5
Portugal 0 1 13 14 0 0 1 15.8
Puerto Rico (US) 0 0 10 10 3 0 1 10
Romania 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 5.9
Russia 0 1 8 12 3 0 1 7.7
St. Lucia 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 4.5
Saudi Arabia 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 10.5
Serbia 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2.3
Singapore 0 0 10 13 3 0 1 26.5
Slovakia 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 10.2
Slovenia 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 12
South Africa 0 7 35 35 7 0 1 8.5
Spain 2 2 39 58 19 1 1 18
Sri Lanka 0 1 1 3 0 0 1 3.3
Sweden 0 2 4 14 0 0 1 22.2
Switzerland 0 2 20 26 5 0 1 28.6
Taiwan 2 1 2 14 0 0 1 17.4
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7
Thailand 0 4 17 27 2 2 1 6.7
Trinidad/Tobago 0 0 3 5 1 0 1 9.5
Turkey 0 2 10 10 2 1 1 6.8
Ukraine 1 2 4 6 0 0 1 3.9
United Arab
Emirates
0 1 3 10 1 0 1 22.8
United Kingdom 1 2 39 55 22 15 1 22.8
U.S. Virgin Islands 1 0 6 11 3 1 1 15
Uruguay 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 9.322  Gwin
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Vanuatu (Oceania) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3
Venezuela 0 0 4 4 3 0 1 6.2
Vietnam 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2.0
Zimbabwe 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2.5
 References
Aalberts, R. J. and A. M. Townsend, Residential Real Estate on the Web: New Challenges
and New Opportunities for Real Estate Professionals, Real Estate Finance Journal, 1999,
15:2, 66–8.
Baen, J. S. and R. S. Guttery, The Coming Downsizing of Real Estate: Implications of
Technology, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 1997, 3:1, 1–18.
Bardhan, A. D., D. Jaffee and C. Kroll, The Internet, E-Commerce and the Real Estate
Industry, Research Reports Paper 6100, Fisher Center for Real Estate & Urban Economics,
University of California–Berkeley, 2000.
Benjamin, J. D. and P. T. Chinloy, Technological Innovation in Real Estate Brokerage,
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1995, 10:1, 35–44.
Benjamin, J. D., G. D. Jud, K. A. Roth and D. T. Winkler, Technology and Realtor Income,
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2002a, 25:1, 51–65.
——., The Internet and the Financial Performance of Residential Brokerage Firms,
Research Paper Series Number: FIN02002, University of North Carolina–Greensboro,
2002b.
Bond, M. T., M. J. Seiler, V. L. Seiler and B. Blake, Uses of Websites for Effective Real
Estate Marketing, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 2000, 6:2, 203–10.
Crowston, K. and R. T. Wigand, Real Estate War in Cyberspace: An Emerging Electronic
Market?, International Journal of Electronic Markets, 1999, 9:1–2, 1–8.
Crowston, K., S. Sawyer and R. Wigand, Investigating the Interplay between Structure and
Information and Communications Technology in the Real Estate Industry, Information
Technology & People, 2001, 14:2, 163–83.
Delcoure, N. V. and N. G. Miller, How Do U.S. Residential Brokerage Trends & Fees
Compare to the Rest of the World?, Real Estate Issues, 2001, 26:3, 64–9.
Ford, J. S. and R. Rutherford, E-Commerce and the Real Estate Housing Market:
Perceptions of Brokers and Salespersons, 2002—Eighth Americas Conference on
Information Systems, 271–9.
Guttery, R. S., J. S. Baen and J. Benjamin, Alamo Realty: The Effects of Technology
Changes on Real Estate Brokerage, Journal of Real Estate Practice and Education, 2000,
3:1, 71–84.International Comparisons of Real Estate  23
JRER  Vol. 26  No. 1 – 2004
Jud, G. D. and S. Roulac, The Future of the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry,
Real Estate Issues, 2001, 26:2, 22–30.
Jud, G. D., D. T. Winkler and G. S. Sirmans, The Impact on Information Technology on
Real Estate Licensee Income, Journal of Real Estate Practice and Education, 2002, 5:1,
1–16.
Miles, M. E., The Two Real Estate Dot-Coms, Real Estate Finance, 2000, 17:2, 1–4.
Moore, C., Realtors are Staking New Territory Online, InfoWorld, 2000, 22:33, 33.
Muhanna, W. A., E-Commerce in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry, Journal of Real
Estate Practice and Education, 2000, 3:1, 1–16.
Ong, S. E., N. Miller and Y. L. Chow, Do Top Agents Cherry-pick?, Working paper,
National University of Singapore, 2002.
Seiler, M. J., V. L. Seiler and M. T. Bond, Uses of Information Technology in the Real
Estate Brokerage Industry, Real Estate Issues, 2001, 26:1; 43–53.
Sirmans, G. S. and P. G. Swicegood, Determining Real Estate Licensee Income, Journal
of Real Estate Research, 2000, 20:1/2, 189–204.
Stanﬁll, J., How Brokers Can Counter the Risks of Disintermediation by Embracing and
Leveraging Technology Trends, Real Estate Issues, 1999/2000, 24:4, 12–6.
Tse, R. Y. C. and J. R. Webb, The Effectiveness of a Web Strategy for Real Estate
Brokerage, Journal of Real Estate Literature, 2002, 10:1, 121–30.
Tucillo, J. A., Technology and the Housing Markets, Business Economics, 1997, 32:3, 17–
20.
Zumpano, L. V., K. H. Johnson, and R. I. Anderson, Internet Use and Real Estate Brokerage
Market Intermediation, Working paper 02-18, Auburn University Montgomery, 2002.
The author thanks two anonymous referees for useful suggestions; Wayne Archer,
discussant, and session participants at the AREUEA International Real Estate
Conference, Cancun, Mexico, May 8, 2001, for helpful comments; Malcolm Gold for
excellent research assistance; and Carol Gwin for editorial comments.
Carl R. Gwin, Baylor University, Waco, TX 76798-8003 or carl gwin@baylor.edu.